Equality, Priority or Sufficiency: Competing Approaches to Distributive Justice
Introduction
One of the most significant debates in contemporary political theory concerns the moral foundations of distributive justice. While egalitarianism has long dominated discussions of justice, several theorists have questioned whether equality should be the central moral goal. This has given rise to an influential debate between three competing approaches: equality, priority, and sufficiency. The question at stake is whether justice requires making people equal, giving priority to the worst-off, or ensuring that everyone has “enough.”
This debate is closely associated with the works of Samuel Scheffler, Derek Parfit, and Harry Frankfurt, and it has become a core topic in Debates in Political Theory in the Delhi University MA Political Science curriculum. Understanding this debate is crucial for evaluating contemporary arguments about inequality, poverty, and social justice.
Conceptual Background: Distributive Justice and Moral Equality
Distributive justice concerns the fair allocation of benefits and burdens in society. Traditional egalitarian theories argue that justice demands equality in some relevant respect, such as resources, welfare, or capabilities. However, critics have pointed out that strict equality may sometimes produce counterintuitive or morally troubling outcomes.
For example, should we prefer a situation where everyone is equally poor over one where some are better off, even if no one is worse off? Such questions have motivated alternative principles that retain concern for moral equality without endorsing equality as an overriding distributive goal.
Equality as a Moral Ideal
Egalitarian theories hold that inequality is morally objectionable in itself. According to this view, justice requires reducing inequalities between individuals, regardless of whether anyone is harmed by those inequalities. Equality is valued not merely for its consequences but as an expression of equal moral worth.
However, critics argue that equality can become an “empty” or “fetishized” ideal if pursued without regard to its impact on individuals’ lives. This concern sets the stage for the priority and sufficiency approaches, which seek to capture what is morally important about equality while avoiding its perceived excesses.
The Priority View (Derek Parfit)
The priority view, most clearly articulated by Derek Parfit, rejects equality as a fundamental moral requirement while maintaining that benefiting people matters more the worse off those people are. According to Parfit, what matters is not whether individuals are equal, but whether improvements in well-being help those who are in greater need.
Parfit illustrates this idea by arguing that it is morally better to benefit a person at a very low level of well-being than to provide the same benefit to someone who is already well-off. This view avoids the problem of “levelling down,” where equality is achieved by making everyone worse off.
The priority view thus preserves concern for the disadvantaged without treating inequality itself as intrinsically bad. It shifts the focus from comparative equality to absolute levels of well-being.
Sufficiency as a Moral Threshold (Harry Frankfurt)
The sufficiency view, most prominently defended by Harry Frankfurt, goes even further in rejecting egalitarianism. Frankfurt argues that what matters morally is not whether people have equal amounts, but whether they have enough. Once individuals reach a sufficient level of well-being, additional inequalities above that threshold are morally irrelevant.
According to Frankfurt, moral concern should focus on alleviating deprivation rather than equalizing outcomes. He famously claims that inequality as such is not morally objectionable; what is objectionable is that some people lack what they need to live a decent life.
This view offers a powerful critique of egalitarianism, especially in contexts where resources are scarce and moral urgency demands prioritizing those below a sufficiency threshold.
Scheffler’s Relational Egalitarianism
Samuel Scheffler offers a nuanced critique of both strict egalitarianism and its alternatives. He argues that the moral significance of equality lies not primarily in distributive outcomes, but in the social relationships that inequality creates. Extreme inequalities can undermine relations of mutual respect and political equality.
Scheffler does not reject concerns about priority or sufficiency, but he insists that they cannot fully replace egalitarian ideals. According to him, justice requires addressing inequalities that generate domination, stigma, or unequal political standing, even if basic needs are met.
This relational egalitarian perspective reorients the debate from distributive metrics to the quality of social and political relations.
Comparative Analysis: Equality, Priority, and Sufficiency
The disagreement between equality, priority, and sufficiency reflects deeper moral intuitions about justice. Egalitarians emphasize comparative fairness, prioritarians focus on helping the worst-off, and sufficientarians stress meeting basic thresholds.
While the priority view addresses some of the excesses of egalitarianism, it may still permit large inequalities as long as the worst-off benefit. The sufficiency view risks ignoring inequalities that undermine democratic equality once basic needs are met. Scheffler’s approach attempts to reconcile these concerns by highlighting the relational consequences of inequality.
Criticism and Counter-Criticism
Each position faces important criticisms. Egalitarianism is challenged for its vulnerability to levelling-down objections. The priority view is criticized for failing to account for the moral significance of relative inequality. Sufficiency theories are accused of setting arbitrary thresholds and overlooking inequalities that affect social status and political power.
Defenders respond by emphasizing moral pluralism. Many argue that justice cannot be captured by a single principle and that concerns about equality, priority, and sufficiency must be balanced rather than treated as mutually exclusive.
Contemporary Relevance
This debate has significant implications for contemporary politics, including debates over taxation, welfare policy, and global inequality. Questions about whether policy should aim at equality, poverty reduction, or ensuring minimum standards of living reflect these competing moral frameworks.
In political theory, the debate continues to shape discussions on social justice, democratic legitimacy, and moral responsibility, making it a key area of study in MA Political Science Notes.
Relevance for MA Political Science Exams (DU)
For Delhi University MA Political Science students, this topic is essential because it:
- Clarifies competing principles of justice
- Enables critical comparison of major theorists
- Links normative theory with policy debates
- Frequently appears in analytical essay questions
Conclusion
The debate between equality, priority, and sufficiency reveals the complexity of distributive justice. While egalitarianism highlights the moral importance of equal standing, the priority and sufficiency views challenge the idea that equality should be the ultimate goal. Through the works of Parfit, Frankfurt, and Scheffler, contemporary political theory offers a richer and more nuanced understanding of justice—one that balances fairness, need, and social relations.
Suggested Readings
- Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority?
- Harry Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal
- Samuel Scheffler, Equality and Tradition
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Distributive Justice”
- G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice
FAQs
Q1. What is the main difference between equality and priority?
Equality focuses on reducing differences, while priority focuses on benefiting the worse off.
Q2. What does Frankfurt mean by sufficiency?
Justice requires ensuring that everyone has enough, not that everyone has the same.
Q3. Why does Parfit reject strict egalitarianism?
Because equality can be achieved through levelling down, which is morally implausible.
Q4. How does Scheffler reinterpret equality?
He emphasizes social and relational equality rather than distributive equality alone.
Q5. Can priority and sufficiency replace equality?
Scheffler argues they cannot fully replace concerns about relational equality.
Q6. Why is this debate important for DU exams?
It tests conceptual clarity, comparative analysis, and critical evaluation skills.
